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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Project Summary  
In 2015, a former Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) student postulated that emerging commercial satellite 
imagery, combined with computer vision (CV), might drastically change the nature of executing maritime 
domain awareness (MDA). He further surmised that this approach would deliver such detail and depth of 
data that the patterns of life (POL) for high priority vessels of interest (VOI) could be inferred, leading to 
predictive analytics. 
In 2018 we completed our third and final year of MDA research based on the above premise. This paper 
explains the discoveries, operational implications, and challenges encountered in attempting to prove this 
hypothesis. 
This effort included journeys near and far, explorations of many emerging technologies, and lessons 
learned with implications for longer term MDA. The hypothesis remained constant, always guiding the 
research whatever the branch we were chasing. Many students and researchers were involved.   
We found his hypothesis to be technically feasible, yet unachievable due to operational, resource, and 
organizational reasons. This executive summary explains the hypothesis in detail, a chronological review 
of the research achievements, and why technical hypothesis validation did not occur. We end with lessons, 
conclusions, and recommendations.   
Keywords: maritime domain awareness, computer vision, machine learning, non-cooperative vessels of 
interest, UN sanctioned vessels 
Background 
MDA focuses effort related to growing awareness of maritime activity.  The United States Navy (USN) 
prioritizes VOI based on strategic, operational, and tactical guidance. In the near term a VOI may be a 
warship of competitor countries, a United Nations (UN) sanctioned ship, or even illegal fishing boats, if 
any of these impact guidance.   
 
Executing MDA, at its most basic, involves taking the steps necessary to develop an understanding of the 
five W’s with respect to a VOI: What is the name of the vessel? Where is it, and where is it going? Why? 
Who owns and operates it? What are they carrying and for what purpose? When does it arrive? For most 
VOI, learning these items is easy. Vessels over a certain size are required to operate an Automatic 
Information System (AIS), which answers those five questions. Anyone can pay for commercial services 
that provide that information, or, like the Navy has done, acquire AIS receivers and generate the data 
themselves. Navy VOI are of interest for often criminal or other devious reasons where operating AIS is 
not in their best interest. Thus, most Navy VOI fake, spoof, or turn off their AIS.   
 
Finding these kinds of VOI takes lots of intelligence work. It involves analysts leveraging snippets of 
information, resource-intensive collection plans, and tactical application of platforms such as ships, 
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submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft. It may even involve national technical means if the priority is 
high enough. Finding a specific VOI can often be like finding a needle in a haystack, especially in well-
traveled sea lanes.   
 
Commercial images of the oceans are available, for a price. For this research we leveraged the products 
from Digital Globe, since the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) already pays for this 
imagery. There are many more sources, but resource constraints prevented us from accessing them. Since 
commercial imagery is geo-rectified and time stamped, one can surmise the direction, a rough speed 
(based on wake to hull ratio), location, and time from an image. The resolution is good enough to enable 
classification of ship types in broad categories, such as warship, tanker, container carrier, and fishing boat. 
But numerous challenges remain: image sizes are huge, and can take hours to download. Many images 
contain only cloud tops, which are not useful. Once the image is downloaded, it takes many more hours to 
spot ships, then explore and classify them. Our first set of students validated these difficulties.   
 
CV can help resolve these issues. One feeds images of interest, usually VOI into a CV algorithm. Next, you 
collect images (in our case from commercial satellites, but these images could be from aircraft).  The 
algorithm compares the new ones to the library of VOI, and alerts you to images which it thinks are the 
same. Especially early on, you “train” the algorithm by running lots of examples through the system, 
usually with human-provided feedback. While CV tantalizes as a time saving process, there are many new 
issues: Who supports the feedback loop? How does that loop work? What format does the image need to 
be in? Satellite images are from overhead, so will side views work? What if the VOI is partially obscured by 
clouds? Where does one get the original images for the VOI library?  
 
We were fortunate to have CV support from the Office of Naval Research (ONR). They sponsor the 
Surveillance, Persistent Observation, and Target Recognition (SPOTR) project. SPOTR solved nearly all of 
the above issues. One key approach was that they use multiple images, from different points of view, to 
build an internal three dimensional model of the VOI, so that it is much easier for them to match images 
to the VOI library. This also enables them to classify any detection into one of eight categories, in 
accordance with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) standards. Because they applied this 
approach to many objects, they have validated their approach and know their false target rate, which is 
very low (actual number is sensitive information). They also automated the feedback loop and crowd 
sourced it, with remarkable and fast results.     
 
SPOTR addressed the other issue of large file size by working with Digital Globe, Inc. (DG) to insert their 
algorithm directly at the DG ground receiving station site. Because the ocean is big and VOI small, the 
analyzed data sets are much smaller.   
 
How does the Navy use this data? Each VOI is a different case, but in most cases the Navy tends to use the 
Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) decision cycle. If SPOTR provides the observation, then what 
provides the orientations? In this research, the answer was SeaVision. SeaVision is an unclassified 
situation awareness display that displays mainly automatic identification system (AIS) and radar surface 
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contacts. Since it uses multiple AIS sources, and correlates the duplicates, it is quite effective at tracking all 
the world’s vessels, except for the VOI that spoof or turn off AIS (most Navy VOI), which the Navy 
sometimes calls “dark” targets. Part of the hypothesis was that by using the commercially available 
imagery supported with CV, we could deliver a third source of MDA information into SeaVision, and 
increase the ability of the Navy to orient their decision cycle of VOI. Since SeaVision is unclassified, it also 
meant that the Navy could share, if desired, VOI information with allied and coalition partners much 
more rapidly. 
 
The initial piece of the hypothesis involved POL and predictive analytics. POL analysis is a non-trivial task 
involving detailed understanding of various VOI plus large sets of data points of VOI tracks. With enough 
commercial satellite imagery, and leveraging other sources of imagery, this is possible. However, again 
resource constraints prevented us from trying this. POL analysis also requires a specific data architecture. 
This was discussed and designed, but not built. Since predictive analytics are derived from POL 
development, we were unable to explore this in much detail. Still, the operational demand for predictive 
analytics exists, as highlighted in several requirements messages that we were privy to. Our research 
indicated that emerging technologies, such as those based on events, might shed new light on both POL 
analytics and prediction. There are other schools of thought that suggest that the causal relations needed 
to achieve these levels of analysis are not logical, and fail in their assumptions. This remains an area of 
active debate in the machine learning and artificial intelligence worlds.   
 
Findings and Conclusions 
The research remained primarily focused on executing the hypothesis with actual operational units and 
attempting to measure if the Navy’s execution of MDA, especially against VOI, improved or was more 
efficient. We also explored related topics.  
 
Researchers met with the 6th Fleet, 7th Fleet, and Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) MDA 
practitioners. All were interested in new ways to execute MDA; each had different needs. Since our 
operational research sponsor was the 7th Fleet, we focused on their area of responsibility, while enhancing 
our understanding with the other parties.   
 
The 7th Fleet is very interested in one type of VOI, which they use other means to observe and orient on. 
While they were our sponsor, they were not interested so much in the hypothesis. They have a very short 
term time horizon. They directed us to Task Force 73/Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific 
(CTF-73) in Singapore and their Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) exercise. SEACAT 
is designed to explore MDA information sharing among Southeast Asia maritime partners. Though 
interested, they eventually dismissed our efforts as too forward-leaning for their partners to grasp and use. 
We attempted to use SEACAT anyway for VOI tracking, in the background of the exercise execution, but 
it became clear that this was too far down on the priority list for CTF-73. 
 
This was exacerbated by a failure to have any MDA agency actually give us names of VOI. As stated 
above, the SPOTR algorithms compare incoming images to a library of VOI. Building that library is an 
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important and difficult job. Images may be available from organic sources, but declassifying them is 
arduous. Many images (and even three dimensional models) are available commercially, but we faced 
resource constraints. The Office of Naval Intelligence has immense libraries of images, many unclassified, 
but it literally took an official letter from the Chief of Naval Research to the Chief of Naval Intelligence to 
gain access to these images. This occurred too late in our research to have value, though the SPOTR 
project team has been able to use them.   
 
We also encountered difficulties in SPOTR and SeaVision collaboration, again due to resource 
constraints. SeaVision thought they would just ingest tracks derived by SPOTR. That was true, however 
SPOTR needed other tracks in return from SeaVision to validate their approach, which was 
misunderstood. Integration remains incomplete, but the SPOTR and SeaVision engineers have discussed 
how to proceed.   
 
Student thesis work also focused on determining measures to ascertain the hypothesis results. Given a set 
of VOI, the students investigated how to establish a baseline for current VOI MDA. This can be 
accomplished by leveraging current SeaVision data. Again, the team ran into issues. While SeaVision has 
data back several years, they only enable user access back 90 days. While useful in many ways, establishing 
a good baseline would need more data than was available to the students.   
 
The students suggested what the baseline might look like. That is, for any given VOI, how often was it at 
sea? Were there inconsistent track data or suspicious gaps of track information? The idea was to then 
compare the VOI data when the SPOTR to SeaVision connection was made. We believed that over time, 
and with increasing image sources, that the periods of time where VOI were unaccounted for would 
decrease. This means that tactical resources currently tasked to find and track VOI might be better used 
on other missions.   
 
The hypothesis focused on unclassified efforts. Information sharing of classified information to allied and 
coalition partners is time consuming, and thus not tactically relevant, since by the time information is 
finally passed, it is too late to take action. Thus the hypothesis was focused on the unclassified nature. 
Regular naval operations are usually conducted at the SECRET level, so the hypothesis was often 
discounted by U.S .Navy operators as not needed. However, in many private conversation with operators, 
most had stories on how they could have reacted much faster in their OODA loop if they would have been 
able to share faster. This is even more important, since the U.S. Navy has fewer ships, and is making many 
efforts to operate as a combined force with allies and partners.  
 
A special case is JIATF-S, which operates as a multinational task force. They work diligently at 
information sharing, trying their hardest to keep it unclassified. The research finding was that the level of 
effort to maintain information sharing requires a dedicated culture shift and never-ending pressure to 
continue sharing. The default, it appears, is to not share.    
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Three spinoffs of the research are noteworthy. Early in the research, we met other NPS researchers 
involved with social network analysis of MDA related data. They needed VOI to serve as the object to 
concentrate their analysis on. They saw our process as a way to detect and identify “dark” targets. We 
collaborated with this team, and the last set of students are writing a thesis on how to integrate the two 
capabilities. While successful, their sponsors focused on a different geographic area, so complete 
integration could not be achieved. Also, they lost a year of research to resource constraints. We believe 
their analytical approach might also help answer the “What” questions, and might be useful in the POL 
acquisition.   
 
The second spin off was very successful. While at 7th Fleet, the imagery analysts there wondered if SPOTR 
could help them with an image-related issue. They check images of various ports of interest daily, seeking 
to understand changes. Since this was vessel related, SPOTR thought they could detect if any given image 
of the same place had experienced changes, at least with respect to vessels. After three months this 
capability was operational at 7th Fleet, and has now been expanded to the 5th Fleet and the 24th 
Intelligence Squadron at Ramstein AB (where the change detection is executed on more than just vessels).  
 
The third spinoff was recognition that SPOTR works on images taken from any camera. Thesis research 
was conducted to explore the concept that every air vehicle in the naval inventory ought to use SPOTR to 
detect various intelligence and operational objects of interest. SPOTR had already proven this in two 
experiments. The thesis was passed to the Marine Corps and the Naval Aviation Systems Command. The 
Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force Weapons School was also briefed. 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Technically, the hypothesis will work. There are integration issues, but none noteworthy. To achieve POL 
and predictive analysis requires a sufficient data architecture to support additional artificial intelligence 
tools. The data architecture requires paying attention to the five V’s: volume, veracity, value, variety, and 
volume, since failure to account for them would result in slow or inoperable functionality. Since POL is 
difficult, the additional algorithms required may require significant investment.  
 
CV is a machine learning (ML) based approach. POL would likely use similar ML or artificial intelligence 
approaches. These are most successful with lots of data. DG imagery is not enough input to meet those 
ML data requirements. Successful implementation of this approach would require subscription to other 
commercial satellite resources at additional cost.   
 
While the research team believes that this approach would result in more effective dark MDA VOI 
tracking, and also provide a more efficient use of resources, actual metrics, as described above, need to be 
collected. There is also the potential issue of the compilation of many unclassified sources that, when 
combined, might produce information that is regarded as classified. More work is needed in this area.   
 
Another area of further research is recommended. If researchers from NPS can put together a capability 
with little resources to detect almost any known vessel at sea using just unclassified and readily available 
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data, what repercussions does this have for the Navy in their operations? In theory, a competitor with 
resources could use the same techniques focused on vessels of their interest, e.g., U.S. Navy vessels.    
 
The research team almost received a key breakthrough in April 2018, when 7th Fleet indicated that UN 
sanctioned VOI were of particular interest. The team was confident that this approach, combined with the 
dark MDA networks research, could bear immediate operational fruit. No follow up occurred by 7th 
Fleet.   
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